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Abstract
In federal countries the allocation of renewable energy (RE) deployment is simultaneously
regulated by national and subnational governments. We analyze the efficiency of federal co-
regulation when different types of policy instruments – price and quantity – are assigned to
government levels. Using an analytical model with two regulatory levels, we specify con-
ditions that ensure first-best allocation of RE deployment in equilibrium. These efficiency
conditions refer to how the financial burden of the national RE support scheme should be
shared among subnational jurisdictions. Under realistic assumptions national price-based
regulation is efficient if burden shares are proportional to population shares, regardless of
the subnational policy instrument. Contrary, under national quantity-based regulation ef-
ficiency conditions depend on the subnational policy instrument. While with subnational
price-based regulation burden shares should be oriented towards first-best RE deployment
shares, with subnational quantity-based regulation burden shares should be oriented towards
population shares.
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1 Introduction
Worldwide, national governments aim at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (REN21,
2019). Achieving the national transition to a decarbonized power sector essentially relies on
vast expansion of large-scale renewable energy (RE) plants. To this end, national governments
support RE deployment through price incentives implemented via feed-in tariffs (FiT) or tender
schemes. In countries with federal systems national governments co-regulate RE deployment
together with subnational authorities. Commonly, subnational governments (e.g. at the state,
province, or municipality level) pick siting areas for installations of RE power plants through
spatial planning (Keenleyside et al., 2009; Pettersson et al., 2010; Iglesias et al., 2011; Power &
Cowell, 2012; Cowell et al., 2017). Partly, subnational governments also resort to price incentives
to guide regional RE expansion, for example in Spain, Germany, or Denmark (Iglesias et al.,
2011; Lienhoop, 2018; Jørgensen et al., 2020). Thus, national support schemes that set incentives
for RE deployment often overlap with subnational policies. Our work analyzes how the interplay
of national with subnational regulation affects the overall efficiency of RE deployment.
As subnational governments represent their own jurisdictions and are concerned about their
own welfare, preferences of national and subnational governments often do not coincide (i.a.
Ohl & Eichhorn, 2010; Pettersson et al., 2010). The incentives of subnational governments may
diverge from those of national governments for two reasons. On the one hand, subnational gov-
ernments do not fully consider nationwide benefits of GHG emissions reduction, but primarily
focus on regional external cost of large-scale RE plants. These regional externalities are dis-
amenities, like impacts on residents and ecosystems on site (Zerrahn, 2017; Krekel & Zerrahn,
2017; von Möllendorff & Welsch, 2017; Gibbons, 2015). Consequently, subnational governments
may have an incentive to underprovide promotion of RE deployment, i.e., to over-restrict RE
deployment. This intra-national underprovision problem is analogous to the well-known under-
provision problem of climate policy at the international level (Barrett, 1994).
On the other hand, national RE support schemes encumber subnational jurisdictions with
financial burden shares, i.e., subnational jurisdictions are directly or indirectly funding national
subsidy costs via levies or taxes (Council of European Energy Regulators, 2018). While these
financing mechanisms are irrelevant for national policy choice, they may create strategic incen-
tives for subnational governments. By attracting RE deployment and national remuneration
payments, subnational governments have an incentive to exploit this common pool of jointly
financed RE subsidies and to overprovide promotion of RE deployment within their own juris-
dictions (e.g. for Germany see Gawel & Korte, 2015). Overall, these incentives for subnational
regulators may lead to an inefficient nationwide allocation of RE deployment. Hence, under
federal RE regulation there is need for a regulatory design that provides efficient coordination
among national and subnational RE policies in the presence of these strategic incentives.1
1Most of the literature on climate change policy studies the interaction among national governments in the
international arena implicitly assuming that subnational authorities have a merely executive function. In fact,
subnational governments may substantially affect national policy and its outcome. This is especially true with
regard to overlapping regulations of RE deployment (Goulder & Stavins, 2011). Equally, (Shobe & Burtraw,
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We take up this issue and analyze different regulatory designs of federal regulation, each reg-
ulatory design varying with respect to the policy instrument assigned to different administrative
layers. In particular, we aim to understand how the assignment of policy instruments to national
and subnational layers affects the efficiency of federal co-regulation? Thus, we examine under
which conditions different federal regulatory designs implement socially optimal RE expansion.
To answer our research question, we build a stylized two-level regulation model where a
national government and subnational state governments apply overlapping RE policies, simulta-
neously steering spatial allocation of RE deployment. Of course, under centralized competences
a perfectly informed national government could implement the social optimum by means of
regionally differentiated price incentives. However, in federal systems regulatory powers are ver-
tically distributed. Furthermore, due to other policy goals or constitutional rules, for example
requirements of the EU state aid law or national laws ensuring equal treatment of subnational
regions, national policies are typically bound to spatially uniform instruments. Given these
(real-world) constraints, we analyze the efficient design of federal regulation considering at the
national layer
(i) price-based instruments (i.e. remunerations set through administrative procedures, e.g.
FiT), or
(ii) quantity-based instruments (i.e. remunerations set through tendering procedures, e.g.
tender schemes),
and at the subnational layer
(i) price-based instruments (e.g. compensation schemes, taxes, royalties, levies, or subsidies),
or
(ii) quantity-based instruments (i.e. quantity caps for RE deployment implemented through
spatial planning).
We analyze four regulatory designs of federal co-regulation which represent the possible
combinations of national and subnational policy instruments depicted above. For each regulatory
design we deduce efficiency conditions that ensure socially optimal policy choices by national
and subnational governments. These efficiency conditions refer to how the national subsidy
costs should be distributed among subnational jurisdictions (burden shares). With respect to the
national layer, we find that national price-based regulation implements efficient RE deployment if
burden shares are proportional to population shares regardless of the policy instrument assigned
to the subnational layer. In contrast, the assignment of subnational policy instruments is decisive
given national quantity-based regulation. In this case, different subnational policy instruments
require different efficient designs of burden shares. While with subnational price-based regulation
burden shares should be oriented towards first-best RE deployment shares, with subnational
2012) highlight that interaction of national and subnational RE policies plays a substantial - but often neglected
- role within federal systems when national governments aim at their climate protection goals.
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quantity-based regulation burden shares should be oriented towards population shares. These
findings apply under the realistic assumption that regional disamenities outweigh any possible
regional benefits from RE deployment.
Our work contributes to the branch of environmental and fiscal federalism that looks into
strategic interaction among governments of different federal layers (Oates & Portney, 2003; Di-
jkstra & Fredriksson, 2010). More precisely, we add to the theoretical literature on optimal
regulation of environmental goods in federal systems. In our model the environmental good is
RE deployment and subnational governments consider RE deployment as an impure public good
in that global benefits (public good or altruistic component) are tied to regional externalities
(private good or egoistic component) (Caplan & Silva, 2011; Meya & Neetzow, 2019). Concep-
tually, this problem of co-regulating multiple externalities in a federal system is mainly dealt
with in the literature on pollution control. In that respect, abatement of pollution is analogous
to RE deployment in our work. Accordingly, we assume that by deploying RE power plants
fossil fuel-based power production is substituted such that GHG emissions are reduced.
In two comparable papers on federal co-regulation of transboundary pollution (Silva & Ca-
plan, 1997) and (Caplan & Silva, 1999) analyze the optimal assignment of price and quantity
instruments to different governmental layers within a sequential move setting. The authors do
not find a strictly superior assignment of instruments to government levels (regulatory design),
but stress that efficiency of federal co-regulation is particularly sensitive to the timing of pol-
icy actions by government levels. Settings where subnational governments move first and the
national government moves second are more efficient (”decentralized leadership”).2 In (Silva
& Caplan, 1997) and (Caplan & Silva, 1999) results rest on the assumption that the national
government can choose interregional income transfers in the second stage of the game such that
subnational governments anticipate this and internalize all externalities. By contrast, in our
model, income transfers are exogenously specified in the form of burden shares and we em-
ploy the concept of Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous move game since this more adequately
represents mutually responding policy adjustments of national and subnational governments.
Thereby, we do not highlight one single regulatory design as superior, but specify rules for in-
terregional income transfers which implement efficient co-regulation for each regulatory design.
(Ambec & Coria, 2018) analyze the regulation of local and global pollutants that exhibit
(dis)economies of scope in abatement costs. They spare an explicit specification of interregional
income transfers. They find that both price-based and quantity-based regulation at the global
level always establish the first-best outcome. This finding holds if interregional income trans-
fers are independent from subnational policy choices. Their result applies equally whether local
regulators use taxes or abatement quotas. Unlike (Ambec & Coria, 2018), we explicitly include
an exogenous transfer mechanism which allocates national subsidy costs to subnational juris-
2In a similar manner, (Caplan et al., 2000) and (Caplan & Silva, 2011) study sequential-move games among
national and subnational governments that contribute to pure respectively impure public good provision. They
show that the abovementioned efficiency of decentralized leadership still holds in light of labor mobility if the
national government can make differentiated interregional income transfers.
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dictions. We find that for efficiency, first, the transfer mechanism needs to match a specific
distribution rule, and second, this efficient distribution rule (efficient burden sharing) depends
on the combination of national and subnational instruments (regulatory design).
Our theoretical model setup is based on (Williams III, 2012). He likewise analyzes the in-
teraction of national and state policies co-regulating a pollutant that causes nationwide and
regional externalities at the same time. He assumes that national and subnational governments
apply the same type of instrument, i.e., both either price-based or quantity-based regulation.
(Williams III, 2012) finds that the application of price-based instruments leads to more effective
pollution reductions and likely to a more efficient outcome than the application of quantity-
based instruments. In his model this is because, on average, the national price-based instrument
shapes the net marginal benefits of states’ policy choices such that states choose to internalize
their regional externalities while the national policy concurrently internalizes nationwide exter-
nalities. We extend his approach by studying the efficiency of instrument mixes where different
policy instruments are assigned to the national and subnational level. As (Williams III, 2012)
we show that national price-based regulation is likely preferable to national quantity-based reg-
ulation. In our model this stems from the specification of states’ burden shares that implement
first-best outcome. We find that under national price-based regulation these efficient burden
shares are equal to states’ population shares. In practice, the latter is likely met due to national
financing schemes that are commonly in place. Moreover, within our RE setting the subna-
tional quantity instrument, i.e. quantity caps for RE deployment, differs from the subnational
quantity instrument, i.e. emissions caps, within the pollution control setting in (Williams III,
2012). Transferred to our model emissions caps would resemble minimum RE deployment lev-
els. However, we model subnational spatial planning as setting maximum RE deployment levels.
Therefore, and opposed to (Williams III, 2012), the quantity of nationwide RE deployment pro-
moted by the national government may be effectively cut by the quantity choices of subnational
governments.
Most recently, (Meya & Neetzow, 2019) transfered Williams III’s model to the case of RE
policy. They scrutinize which RE support scheme at the national tier – feed-in tariffs or tenders
– performs better if state governments are able to set regional price incentives. According to
their results, both national support schemes may be efficient depending on the specification of
burden sharing among states. Analogous to (Williams III, 2012), they find that – given price-
based instruments assigned to the national and state layer – a state’s burden share must be equal
to its share of marginal benefits from nationwide RE expansion. In contrast, given a national
tender scheme states’ burden shares must be equal to their shares of first-best nationwide RE
expansion (Meya & Neetzow, 2019). We confirm their results within our model which in addition
to positive also incorporates negative regional externalities of RE deployment. Most importantly,
unlike (Meya & Neetzow, 2019), we allow for a quantity instrument at the subnational layer (i.e.
spatial planning) which is, in our view, more realistic when formalizing subnational regulation in
the context of large scale RE (Keenleyside et al., 2009; Cowell et al., 2017). This is crucial, as we
demonstrate that in the presence of national tender schemes subnational spatial planning more
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likely implements efficient federal regulation than subnational price incentives. This result holds
as long as for advanced expansion levels regional disamenities from RE deployment predominate
over positive regional benefits from RE deployment.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up a two-level regulation model. Section
3 defines the social optimum and presents the case of optimal regulation if there are no policy
constraints. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium outcomes of the four regulatory designs of interest
and defines efficiency conditions for each of them. These results are discussed in Section 5 and
are linked to RE deployment and regulation in Germany. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We model regulation of RE expansion in a nation with a two-level federal system. The nation
is composed of n states. A national government exerts nationwide RE policy that is uniformly
effective in all states. State governments exert RE policies that are only effective within their
respective jurisdictions.
Given national and state-level RE policies, electricity suppliers decide on actual RE deploy-
ment in each state. Formally, we set up a two-stage game where firstly policies are set and
secondly suppliers choose the amount of electricity produced from RE. In the first stage, na-
tional and state governments set their mutually best policy responses, assuming governments
readjust their policies given the policy decisions of other governments. In other words, we look
at the Nash equilibrium of national and state policies. In the second stage, after equilibrium
policies are implemented, suppliers choose RE deployment. The amount of electricity produced
from RE capacities installed in state i is denoted by xi.
National population is normalized to one and state i has a population share of ηi, hence∑n
i=1 ηi ≡ 1.
2.1 Costs and Benefits
We include three types of costs and benefits. First, installing and operating RE capacities
for power production generates costs for suppliers. Power production costs of generating a
certain amount of electricity xi from RE in state i are denoted by Ci(xi). Due to geographical
characteristics, e.g. wind speed or solar irradiation, productivity of RE plants depends on their
location, and consequently power production costs differ across states, Cj(·) 6= Ci(·), ∀j 6= i.
Within a state, power production costs increase as the productivity of sites decreases. Hence,
we assume costs to be convex with ∂Ci∂xi > 0 and
∂2Ci
∂x2i
> 0, ∀i. The underlying assumption is
that with increasing RE deployment productivity declines, e.g. because wind turbines need to
be installed at less windy sites (as in Lancker & Quaas, 2019).
Second, since RE plants substitute fossil-fuel based power plants they reduce GHG emissions.
These nationwide external benefits from emissions reductions are captured by B(·). Benefits
from emissions reductions are the same for residents nationwide.3 We assume that B(·) depends
3We think this simplification is tenable since our analysis aims at explaining subnational policy choices in
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Third, using RE causes regional external costs to residents living in the same state, denoted
by Di(·). State-specific externalities mainly comprise regional disamenities from RE deployment,
like noise or visual impacts through wind power plants (i.a. Zerrahn, 2017). We assume regional
disamenities to depend on the amount of electricity produced from RE plants installed in a state,
xi. This is a reasonable assumption as increasing electricity generation requires more capacity
and more (and larger) RE plants which cause regional disamenties. There may also be regional
external benefits from RE deployment, Di(·) < 0 and ∂Di∂xi < 0, e.g. positive effects on regional
GDP and employment. However, since these regional external benefits are relatively small (i.a.
Többen, 2017; Ejdemo & Söderholm, 2015; Mauritzen, 2020) we assume that as regional RE




> 0 such that lim
xi→∞





2.2 Welfare Functions and Policy Instruments
National and state governments are assumed to be benevolent. The national government consid-
ers all costs and benefits from nationwide RE expansion, while state governments consider their
respective state-specific costs and benefits. Each government cares about the sum of utilities of
its citizens and about the profit of its regional supplier, since we assume that each supplier is
owned by citizens of the state in which the supplier operates. In other words, governments seek
to maximize their corresponding welfare.
National Government
The welfare function of the national government is defined as follows:







The first term in (1) expresses nationwide benefits from nationwide RE deployment, e.g. through
climate protection. As climate protection is a public good, people in all states benefit from RE
deployment in any single state. These benefits are represented by
∑n
i=1 ηiB(X) which is equal
to B(X). The second term in (1) comprises all state-specific costs of nationwide RE deployment.
For each state, state-specific costs consist of regional external costs that affect regional residents
Di(xi) and regional power production costs Ci(xi) that are borne by the supplier.
In order to internalize the external benefit, the national government implements a RE support
scheme. This scheme be price-based (e.g., implemented through a feed-in tariff) or quantity-
based (e.g., implemented through a tender scheme). For either support scheme, let pN denote
nationwide uniform remuneration for one unit of RE-based electricity. With price-based regula-
tion the national government administratively determines the level of pN . With quantity-based
the presence of national and regional externalities. Allowing for diverging regional benefits from nationwide RE
expansion does not change the fundamental rationale underlying subnational policies. Of course, we thereby
abstract from reality (Ricke et al., 2018).
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regulation the national government chooses a tender volume X̄ such that the level of pN is set
through tendering procedures. Here, the national government also has the option to set a ceiling
price p̄ which is common practice for most tender schemes and works as a safeguard to protect
against absent competition (Grashof et al., 2020).




are funded through a financing scheme (e.g., levy on the electricity price or general taxation).
These expenditures are assumed to be irrelevant for national welfare because they simply consti-
tute a transfer from electricity consumers to electricity producers. In other words, the national
government’s welfare function is quasilinear in money.4
State Governments
The welfare function of state i’s government is given by:
Wi(xi,x−i, p




Analogous to the national government, a state government’s welfare function comprises the sum
of utilities of all its state residents. Firstly, this implies that each state government only cares
about its own fraction of external costs and benefits, ηiB(X) − Di(xi). States do not per se
internalize benefits for other states arising from RE deployment in their own jurisdiction, but
fully take into account the regional external costs. Therefore, states tend to under-provide
regional RE deployment depending on their population share ηi. Secondly, states consider
profits of their citizen-owned suppliers that correspond to revenues from national RE support
and power production costs of regional RE deployment, pNxi −Ci(xi). Additionally, each state




γ = (γ1, ..., γn) we denote the vector of fixed state-specific burden shares of national funding
costs, representing some funding mechanism (e.g., non-tax levies or general taxation). All states
together entirely finance the national RE support scheme, i.e.
∑n
i=1 γi ≡ 1. Taken together,
receiving from and paying into the jointly funded national support scheme, establishes incentives
for states to exploit the common subsidy pool to a greater or lesser extent. This depends on
their individual burden share γi.
State governments are either equipped with price or quantity instruments. Assuming the for-
mer, let pSi denote the state-level price incentive for one unit of RE-based electricity production
in state i. State-level price incentives comprise, e.g., compensation payments for deploying RE
power plants or, in contrast, state-level price incentives can promote regional RE deployment,
e.g., through tax exemptions. Thereby, state governments can reduce (increase) regional RE
deployment, e.g., in order to avert (raise) regional disamenities (benefits).
4It is easy to see that spending budget on a national RE support scheme is a zero-sum game for the national
government. The sum of nationwide disbursed RE remunerations,
∑n
i=1 p
Nxi, enters in (1) with a positive sign
as it depicts revenues for electricity suppliers. At the same time, national RE remunerations need to be financed
through taxes or levies on citizens, thus, the same term also enters with a negative sign. Hence, expenditures and
revenues cancel out and (1) is unchanged regardless of the policy instrument applied at the national tier.
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Assuming quantity-based state-level regulation, state governments decide on a quantity cap
(or limit) on RE deployment within their respective jurisdictions. Let x̄i denote state i’s quantity
cap. Hence, we model spatial planning in the form of a command-and-control instrument.
Formalizing spatial planning procedures in this way captures their essential feature regarding
RE deployment, namely the provision of expansion areas for RE deployment (Keenleyside et al.,
2009; Pettersson et al., 2010; Power & Cowell, 2012). By setting a quantity cap for regional RE
deployment, state governments can confine the amount of regional externalities.
Since state governments’ welfare functions are quasilinear, again, under state-level price reg-
ulation expenditures and revenues from state-level price incentives cancel out at the state layer.5
Equally, if states govern regional RE deployment through spatial planning policies, this does not
change the composition of their welfare function assuming that spatial planning does not have
any budgetary implications. Since all governments are benevolent and we assume quasilinear
welfare functions, all state welfare functions add up to the national welfare function.
Electricity Suppliers
We assume that in each state a single supplier decides on the amount of state-specific power
production, xi. Every supplier chooses the regional RE expansion level xi in order to maximize
its profit. The profit function of the supplier in state i is defined as follows:
πi(xi, p
N ) = (pN + pSi )xi − Ci(xi) ∀i (3)
The first term in (3) expresses the supplier’s revenues from national and state-level prices paid
for its RE deployment in state i. Of course, if states regulate through spatial planning instead of
price incentives, the first term reduces to pNxi. In the case that states regulate through spatial
planning, suppliers can expand RE deployment as far as state-specific quantity caps allow it.
Formally, this is denoted by xi ≤ x̄i, ∀i. As every supplier is owned by residents living in the
state where the supplier is operating this implies that revenues from regional RE deployment
remain within that state.6
3 Social Optimum and Policy Constraints
Before analyzing the outcomes of different federal regulatory designs, we first determine the
socially optimal (or first-best) allocation of RE deployment. This provides the benchmark
against which the outcomes of the regulatory designs can be compared subsequently.
5Formalizing state-specific price incentives as neutral to state welfare implies that we refer to explicit price
policies that spend or generate public revenues rather than implicit price policies that alter RE deployment cost.
While in general spatial planning is used to regulate RE deployment at the state layer, subnational price incentives
are solely applied in few countries (Iglesias et al., 2011; Lienhoop, 2018; Jørgensen et al., 2020).
6Note that a profit maximizing supplier is in line with the assumption that intra-state expansion patterns of
RE deployment are well described by ∂
2C
∂x2
> 0. Within each state the supplier first builds on sites with lower
power production costs and continues to exploit more costly sites afterwards.
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3.1 Social Optimum
The socially optimal allocation of RE deployment across states maximizes national welfare and
is denoted by x∗ = (x∗1, ..., x
∗
n). It is derived by differentiating eq. (1) w.r.t. xi and setting the







= 0 ∀i (4)
By eq. (4), the socially optimal RE expansion level for state i increases with the marginal
nationwide benefit of emissions reduction. It falls with the marginal state-specific external cost
of RE deployment and the marginal state-specific power production cost of RE deployment.
The social optimum is characterized such that for neither state there is an additional net
benefit from deploying one more unit of RE. For each state overall marginal benefits equate
overall marginal cost of expanding RE. Due to homogeneous nationwide benefits from RE ex-
pansion ( ∂B∂X is not state-specific), at the social optimum, marginal cost per state are equalized









, ∀j 6= i.






Clearly, the social optimum can be easily attained, if RE expansion is regulated by a unitary
national government, and if national regulation can be differentiated. Given a regionally differ-
entiable price instrument pNi a unitary government can implement the social optimum charac-
terized by (4). To see that, we first define each supplier’s deployment decision by differentiating





Eq. (5) implicitly defines the supplier’s choice for RE deployment in state i. Substituting (5)







If eq. (6) is satisfied across all states, suppliers would incorporate nationwide and regional
externalities into their profit maximization and produce the first-best amount of electricity
from RE plants. Hence, within a unitary state the social optimum can be easily implemented
through regionally differentiated price incentives. In our perfect information environment, no
further analysis would be needed.
In fact, often in the literature regulatory power is assumed to be centralized at the national
layer, like in a unitary state (criticized by Shobe & Burtraw, 2012). Yet, in many countries
national governments face two main constraints: a vertical division of regulatory power among
layers of government (federal structure), and a limitation to uniform regulation policies at the
national layer (e.g. due to further policy goals or constitutional rules). Given these constraints,
the subsequent analysis derives conditions for the co-regulation of national and state-level RE
policies to be designed efficiently, meaning such that the first-best allocation is implemented.
9
4 RE deployment under Federal Co-regulation
In our analysis, we compare the efficiency of four different regulatory designs. These four regula-
tory designs are defined by combinations of different policy instruments assigned to the national
and state layer. For each governmental layer we include two possible policy instruments – a
price-based instrument and a quantity-based instrument. Table 1 illustrates the composition of
the four regulatory designs that are subsequently analyzed. Each regulatory design is composed
of a mix of policy instruments across the two federal layers. We label the regulatory designs
by abbreviations, e.g. Price & Quantity. The first term covers the policy instrument assigned
to the national layer, and the second term covers the policy instrument assigned to the state layer.
Table 1 Regulatory Designs
State level















In the following, we derive efficiency conditions for each regulatory design. Efficiency condi-
tions determine exogenous parameters (like states’ burden shares) such that national and state
governments choose equilibrium policies that lead to first-best RE deployment (cf. eq. (4)). We
derive the equilibrium outcome by backward induction. Accordingly, we first determine the sup-
pliers’ RE deployment decisions, and second derive the equilibrium policies of the simultaneous
move game among national and state governments.
4.1 National Price-Based Regulation
First, we study the two regulatory designs where the national government administratively
determines a uniform price level of RE remuneration (I and II).
4.1.1 Regulatory Design I: Price & Price
We start with the regulatory design where states implement a price incentive in addition to
the national price-based RE support scheme (Price & Price regulation). In the first stage
of the game, governments at both federal layers simultaneously choose their policy decisions.
State governments decide on the level of their state-specific price incentives, pS = (pS1 , ..., p
S
n),
and the national government decides on the level of its nationwide feed-in tariff, pN . Once all
governments have set their policies, in the second stage suppliers decide on RE deployment,
x = (x1, ..., xn), by maximizing their profits in the context of this regulatory environment.
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Following backward induction, in the second stage of the game we define suppliers’ RE
deployment decisions by differentiating their profit function eq. (3) w.r.t. xi. It follows that in
equilibrium in each state suppliers expand RE satisfying:




In each state suppliers expand RE deployment until their marginal power production costs
equate the effective net subsidy level.
In the first stage of the game all governments anticipate effects of their own and effects of
co-regulating governments according to eq. (7). In Nash equilibrium, each government takes
the policy decisions of all other governments as given. We first look at policy decisions at the
state layer. State governments take the national policy pN as given when setting their optimal
policies. Using eq. (7), we derive state i’s best policy response to pN by differentiating state i’s











+ (1− γi)pN = 0 ∀i (8)
According to eq. (8) each state government only takes into account marginal external benefits





. Furthermore, each state considers net
national subsidies flowing into its own jurisdiction for an additional unit of RE-based electricity
produced on site, (1−γi)pN − ∂Ci∂xi . The latter is composed of marginal net profit of the regional
supplier less marginal financing costs of national RE support. To obtain each state’s best






− γipN ∀i (9)
For the sake of argument, consider for a moment the case without national RE support (pN = 0),
which depicts the case of decentralized state-level RE regulation. For this case, eq. (9) tells us
that state governments tax regional RE deployment (pSi < 0), if marginal regional benefits from












Now, if the national government promotes RE deployment through prices (pN > 0), the
price incentive that a state chooses falls with the national support level,
∂pSi
∂pN
< 0, and it also
falls with the state’s burden share of national subsidy costs,
∂pSi
∂γi
< 0. The former originates










rises with the expansion of RE plants. The latter is intuitive as a state
has to finance itself an increasing part of the monetary benefit that it is receiving through the
national RE support scheme.
For the national government, we derive the equilibrium policy by differentiating the national





























As we already know, state governments internalize both private power production costs and
external costs occurring within their jurisdictions (see eq. (8)). That is why the national
government merely needs to bother about the interregional spillover, (1 − ηi) ∂B∂X . Also from
eq. (8) we know that states gain net subsidy revenues of (1 − γi)pN per additional unit of
RE deployment. Thus, the national government’s rationale is to utilize this influence on state-
level policy. At best, the national government incentivizes states such that they strive for
the nationally resp. socially optimal RE expansion within their territories. This is achieved
only if the state-specific gain from additional RE deployment equals the interregional spillover,
(1− γi)pN = (1− ηi) ∂B∂X .
If γi = ηi ∀i, then the national government sets the support level to the nationwide benefit
of producing one more unit of electricity from RE, pN = ∂B∂X . In other words, if for all states
the burden share of national subsidy costs is equal to the population share, then the national
government’s equilibrium policy is pN = ∂B∂X . For the case of γi = ηi ∀i, inserting p
N = ∂B∂X into
eq. (8) gives eq. (4). Hence, in each state first-best RE deployment is realized. In contrast,
first-best RE deployment is not implementable, if for at least one state γi 6= ηi ∃i, since then
some state cannot be incentivized properly given a uniform national subsidy. Only differentiated
national regulation would remedy this problem.
Proposition 1. When both the national and state layer regulate through price instruments,
federal co-regulation is efficient, if and only if γi = ηi ∀i. Then the equilibrium policies are






Proof: See Appendix A.
Intuitively, if the efficiency condition of Proposition 1 is true, then national and regional
interests are perfectly aligned because net marginal benefits from expanding RE are the same for
national and state governments. Note that the population share of a state indicates its missing
internalization of benefits to other states. In contrast, the burden share of a state indicates its
incentive to exploit the pool of commonly funded national subsidies.7 If both shares are of the
same size, a state’s tendency to underprovide is balanced by its incentive to take advantage of
the common subsidy pool (given the national government sets pN = ∂B∂X ).
Following eq. (11) we see that mainly these opposing drivers of state-level policies affect
the policy choice of the national government. The national government, in turn, influences
RE allocation not only directly through suppliers’ deployment decisions, but also indirectly
7If a state bears the full costs of national RE support, hence if γi = 1, then for this state the funding of national
RE support is not a common pool anymore. In this case the national government is not able to incentivize the
state’s policy decision, since revenues from and expenditures for national RE support always cancel out for this
state. This is depicted by eq. (8). The state would choose the same policy as without national RE support.
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by affecting state-level co-regulation. Let us refer to these direct and indirect channels as the
marginal quantity effect of national policy, captured by ∂xi
∂pN
(see Appendix A). The marginal










N S ∂B∂X . That is, if the marginal quantity effect of national policy correlates
stronger with states’ population shares than with states’ burden shares, the national support
level lies below ∂B∂X , and vice versa. You may see that by considering a single state with a
population share of η̂ and a burden share of γ̂. To align national and regional interests for this
state, according to eq. (8) the level of national RE remuneration must be lower (higher) than
∂B
∂X if η̂ > γ̂ (η̂ < γ̂).
4.1.2 Regulatory Design II: Price & Quantity
In this section we alter the policy instrument assigned to the state layer. We now assume that
state governments regulate RE expansion through quantity caps and do not set price incentives
anymore. Again, we first define the supplier’s RE deployment decision (second stage) before
analyzing the RE policies (first stage).
The supplier’s optimization problem is distinct from the one under Price & Price regulation
on two points. First, remuneration for one unit of RE-based electricity is solely composed of
the national price incentive because state governments set no price incentives. Second, in each
state the supplier is constrained in its decision on the amount of RE deployment, xi. Every
state implements a quantity cap which limits the maximum amount of RE expansion within
its jurisdiction, xi ≤ x̄i. Differentiating the supplier’s profit function w.r.t. xi subject to the






∧ xi < x̄i
≥ ∂Ci
∂xi
∧ xi = x̄i
(12a)
(12b)
If the supplier intends to deploy less RE than the corresponding quantity cap allows (see eq.
(12a)), the supplier’s first-order condition is similar to eq. (7). If the supplier would like to
deploy as much as or more RE than the corresponding quantity cap approves (see eq. (12b)),
the supplier deploys exactly as much as the quantity cap allows for, xi = x̄i.
For a state government there is no reason to authorize a level of RE deployment that exceeds
its preferred level of RE deployment. Each state sets its quantity cap equal to its welfare
maximizing RE deployment level, x̄i = arg max
xi
Wi(xi). Taking the first derivative of state i’s
welfare function (2) w.r.t. xi and setting the result equal to zero,
∂Wi
∂xi








+ (1− γi)pN = 0 ∀i (13)
Eq. (13) is identical to eq. (8). This means that given price-based regulation at the national layer
and regardless of the policy instrument assigned to the state layer (price-based or quantity-based
regulation) state governments favor the same regional RE expansion, ceteris paribus. Bearing
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in mind that under Price & Price regulation taxing (or subsidizing) regional RE expansion is a
zero-sum game for states, this is straightforward.
Before we can determine the national government’s policy decision, we have to specify when
states’ quantity caps are binding, and when they are not. Because if in state i the quantity cap
is not binding, then the supplier determines actual RE deployment in state i (according to eq.
(12a)). However, if the quantity cap is binding, then the state government determines actual RE
deployment in state i (according to eq. (12b)). In the latter case, the supplier aims at deploying
at least as much RE as the state’s quantity cap allows, pN ≥ ∂Ci∂xi and xi = x̄i.
The following lemma defines under which condition a state’s quantity cap is binding:
Lemma 1.
A state that sets a non-binding quantity cap enacts ambitious policy and has subscript ’a’.








N a ∈ A. (14)
Then state a’s quantity cap is larger than the level of RE deployment preferred by the
supplier. The supplier determines the actual RE expansion level in state a.8
A state that sets a binding quantity cap enacts restrictive policy and has subscript ’r’.







N r ∈ R. (15)
Then state r’s quantity cap is smaller than the level of RE deployment preferred by the
supplier. The state government determines the actual RE expansion level in state r.
To derive the national government’s policy choice we differentiate its welfare function eq. (2)





























































8Note that for the same state eq. (15) may apply if values for pN , γ1, ..., γn change. The set of states that
enact ambitious policies A is a function of pN and γ1, ..., γn. Correspondingly, the same applies for the set of
states that enact restrictive policies R. Note also that A ∪R = N with N = {1, ..., n} and A ∩R = ∅.
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Eq. (17) defines the equilibrium policy of the national government. It also shows that the
choice of the national support level depends on how many states implement ambitious resp.
restrictive policies in equilibrium. More precisely, with regard to restrictive states the ratio
between the correlation of the marginal quantity effect of national policy with states’ population
shares and the correlation of the marginal quantity effect of national policy with states’ burden









(1− γr). With regard to ambitious states primarily the level of
positive marginal externalities ∂Da∂xa is decisive. While national RE support is thus depending on
how many states enact ambitious resp. restrictive policies, the level of the national RE support
itself influences how many states pursue ambitious resp. restrictive policies in the first place
(see Lemma 1).
We know that with increasing pN less states enact ambitious policies resp. more states enact










− γi < 0. Thus, there exists a national support level p̂ such that if pN ≥ p̂
then all state governments enact restrictive policies (note that p̂ is a function of γ1, ..., γn).
As pN rises any state government increases its quantity cap by a smaller amount than the
supplier strives for because marginal net state-specific deployment costs keep increasing (i.e.
marginal external benefits from RE deployment decline while marginal regional external cost
grow). Intuitively, each state demands for a growing compensation for every extra unit of RE
deployment.



























Figure 1 shows this relationship by illustrating the sum of state-level quantity caps dependent
on the national support level. Within the left-hand range, i.e. when the national government
sets pN < p̂, the aggregate quantity cap (dashed orange line) exceeds aggregate nationwide RE
15




i=1 xi. Within the right-hand range, i.e. when the






To analyze national and state-level equilibrium policies, in the following we distinguish be-
tween an equilibrium where at least one state government exerts ambitious policy, pN < p̂ (Case
A), and an equilibrium where all state governments exert restrictive policies, pN ≥ p̂ (Case R).
Case A: pN < p̂
As long as pN < p̂ in equilibrium at least one state government pursues an ambitious RE policy.
Contrary to Price & Price regulation, the national government now has to care about regional
externalities in ambitious states since state-level policies do not effectively steer RE expansion
in these states. Without specifying states’ burden shares we cannot further characterize the
equilibrium. Still, we can draw important conclusions for the most relevant (and realistic) sce-
nario, namely when burden shares are equal to population shares, γi = ηi ∀i. Furthermore, we
introduce the distinction among type-B nations and type-D nations which simplifies the presen-
tation of our results.
Lemma 2.
As a type-B nation we denote a nation where at the social optimum at least in one state





< 0 ∃j.9 As
a type-D nation we denote a nation where at the social optimum in all states regional






Using Lemma 2, we derive the following result:
Proposition 2a. If γi = ηi ∀i, then under Price & Quantity regulation in a type-B nation




i=1 x̄i and the social
optimum is not attainable.10
Proof: See Appendix B.
9For example, think of state j for which power production costs are steeply increasing with increasing regional
RE expansion, but at the same time state j receives external benefits from regional RE expansion at low levels,
including x∗j (e.g. value-creation effects or green preferences may outweigh any negative externalities for lower
levels of RE deployment in that state). Then, from a social welfare (resp. national welfare) perspective, RE
expansion in state j should stop at xj = x
∗
j , although state j’s citizens would experience more positive externalities
from further regional RE expansion.





< 0 applies for only one state, then states’ burden shares can be adjusted
to implement the social optimum (see Appendix B). Regardless of the specification of states’ burden shares, if





< 0, then under Price & Quantity regulation the social
optimum is not attainable.
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Case R: pN ≥ p̂
For pN ≥ p̂ in equilibrium in every state RE deployment proceeds until the state’s quantity cap
binds (restrictive policies), the first term in eq. (16) vanishes and we obtain eq. (10). The same
equilibrium outcome ensues as under Price & Price regulation. Hence, we can state the following:
Proposition 2b. If γi = ηi ∀i, then under Price & Quantity regulation in a type-D nation in




i=1 x̄i, and the social optimum is
implemented.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Supposing burden shares equal population shares, if for first-best RE deployment in all states
marginal regional externalities are negative (type-D nation), then under Price & Quantity regu-
lation all states enact restrictive policies in equilibrium. In turn, if all state governments pursue
restrictive policies, the efficiency condition is the same as under Price & Price regulation (cf.
Proposition 1). Different from Price & Price regulation under Price & Quantity regulation
money from national RE support flows into a state solely through the supplier’s profit and not
additionally through negative state-level price incentives, e.g. taxes. The rationale for the na-
tional government is still defined by eq. (10) resp. (16) and its effectiveness in changing regional















4.2 National Quantity-Based Regulation
In the following, we turn to regulatory designs where the national government governs nationwide
RE deployment through quantity-based regulation (III and IV). Under quantity-based regulation
(e.g. tenders) the national government specifies a fixed maximum amount of electricity that is
subsidized. This tender volume is denoted by X̄. Nationwide all electricity suppliers submit
bids to win support for their RE projects. The level of national RE support, pN , is determined
through the clearing price of a uniform price auction. The national government can set a ceiling
price, p̄, that limits the level of the clearing price, pN ≤ p̄.
4.2.1 Regulatory Design III: Quantity & Price
Under Quantity & Price regulation state governments co-regulate by price incentives. Since
in the second stage suppliers observe national and state-level policies, their RE deployment
decisions are again defined similarly to Price & Price regulation (see eq. (7)). In contrast to
Price & Price regulation, the level of national RE support is not determined directly by the
national government (resp. in an administrative procedure), but it is determined endogenously
through a tendering procedure. This implies that the ceiling price set by the national government
is not binding. If the national government would set a binding ceiling price, then the quantity
put out to tender would not be auctioned off entirely,
∑n
i=1 xi < X̄. At the end of this section we
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analyze under what circumstances the national government rationally opts for a binding ceiling
price. For the moment, we assume pN < p̄.
To analyze national and state-level equilibrium policies, we first look at the equilibrium
conditions that represent the national tendering procedure (i.e. uniform price auction) and
hence determine the level of pN :






xi = X̄ (19)
As under Price & Price regulation, eq. (18) defines state-specific RE deployment as a function
of national and state-level price incentives, xi(p
N , pSi ). Eq. (19) establishes that the entire
tender volume X̄ is tendered off. Therefore, eq. (19) is also referred to as the market clearing
condition (Helm, 2003). This means under Quantity & Price regulation the national government
prescribes the amount of nationwide RE deployment,
∑n
i=1 xi ≡ X. By eq. (18) this implies that
the clearing price pN rises until eq. (19) is satisfied. Hence, the above equilibrium conditions
implicitly define the clearing price as a function of the allocation of regional RE expansion levels
across states, pN (x), and also indirectly as a function of the tender volume.
Of course, national and state governments consider this price mechanism when setting their
RE policies. We first derive state governments’ equilibrium policies. In equilibrium state gov-
ernments take the national policy choice X̄ as given. Since the clearing price is endogenously de-
termined through tenders, state policies can influence pN through increasing or decreasing their
state-specific price incentives, pSi . By increasing (decreasing) p
S
i state i effectively makes RE
deployment in its jurisdiction comparatively cheaper (more expensive) and thus lowers (raises)
the clearing price that ensures nationwide RE deployment of X̄. At the same time, state policies
do not affect aggregate nationwide RE deployment, X. As before, we derive state i’s equilibrium
policy by differentiating eq. (2) w.r.t. pSi , setting
∂Wi
∂pSi





+ pN (x) +
∂pN
∂xi
(xi − γiX̄) = 0 ∀i (20)
Compared to Price & Price regulation, state governments still internalize regional externali-
ties from RE deployment within their own jurisdictions (first term of eq. (20)). Each state
government also considers marginal profit for its supplier (second and third term). However,





= 0. Accordingly, when deciding on its policy, the state government does not care about
benefits from emissions reduction, since these are fixed at ηiB(X̄). Eventually, a state gov-
ernment considers its policy impact on the level of national RE support (last term). Though
nationwide RE expansion does not change due to shifts in states’ policy choices resp. their RE
expansion levels, pN does change, ∂p
N
∂xi
< 0 (see Appendix C). Whether a state benefits or loses
from this change depends on whether RE deployment in a state, xi, is larger or smaller than
the share of nationwide RE deployment that the state is funding, γiX̄.
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(xi − γiX̄) ∀i (21)
According to the second term on the rhs of eq. (21), if in equilibrium state i finances a share
of nationwide RE expansion that is larger (smaller) than the amount of RE expansion in its
own jurisdiction, γiX̄ > xi (γiX̄ < xi), then the state increases (decreases) p
S
i above (below) its
marginal regional external cost. Intuitively, if γiX̄ > xi (γiX̄ < xi), then state i has an incentive
to lower (enhance) the national clearing price, thereby reducing its funding cost from burden
sharing (exploiting common pool resources from burden sharing). By increasing (decreasing)
pSi state i makes RE deployment within its jurisdiction comparatively cheaper (more expensive)
and thus indirectly lowers (enhances) the national clearing price.
For the national government we derive the equilibrium choice by differentiating the national
































Eq. (23) implies that under Quantity & Price regulation the national government promotes a
tender volume X̄ such that the national clearing price deviates from ∂B∂X dependent on the cor-
relation of the state-specific marginal quantity effect of national policy ∂xi
∂pN
with state-specific
incentives to change the national price level by promoting RE deployment within their own state
∂pN
∂xi
(xi − γiX̄). Hence, by the choice of the tender volume the national government internalizes
nationwide externalities, but it also has to consider the price mechanism of the tender scheme
that sets diverging incentives for state governments to steer RE expansion. In particular, under
Quantity & Price regulation the extent of these incentives depends on the ratio of xi
γiX̄
, in con-
trast to Price & Price regulation where it depends on the ratio of ηiγi . This is reflected by the
efficiency condition for Quantity & Price regulation:
Proposition 3. Under Quantity & Price regulation the equilibrium outcome is socially optimal,
if and only if states’ burden shares are defined by γi =
x∗i
X∗ ∀i. Then the equilibrium policies are
X̄ = X∗ and pSi = −
∂Di
∂xi
∀i, and the national clearing price is pN = ∂B∂X .
Proof: See Appendix C.
The efficiency condition for Quantity & Price regulation says that the burden share of every
state γi must be equal to the ratio of first-best RE deployment in its jurisdiction x
∗
i to first-
best nationwide RE deployment X∗. Then, at the social optimum each state government only
considers its own marginal regional externalities from RE deployment, and states’ strategic
incentives to change the clearing price vanish.
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This efficiency condition is very distinct from the one derived for Price & Price regulation
summarized in Proposition 1. Under national Price regulation state governments have an in-
centive to contribute to nationwide RE expansion as much as emissions reduction benefits their
respective residents. This incentive depends on each state’s population share. Therefore, price-
based regulation at the national layer (e.g. FiT) requires states’ burden shares to be distributed
along states’ population shares. In contrast, under Quantity regulation at the national layer
state governments have an incentive to indirectly influence the national clearing price to their
favor. The scope of this incentive depends on each state’s RE deployment share of nationwide
RE deployment. Therefore, quantity-based regulation at the national layer (e.g. tenders) re-
quires states’ burden shares to be distributed along states’ first-best RE deployment shares.
These results are in line with (Williams III, 2012) and (Meya & Neetzow, 2019) who also find
this switch in the underlying incentive structure of state policy. However, our model addition-
ally stresses the importance of states’ population shares and of the state-specific effectiveness of
national policy.11
Eventually, we include the possibility that the national government can set a binding ceiling
price. Up to now, we have assumed that the clearing price is competitively determined, pN < p̄,
and the national tender volume is entirely tendered off,
∑n
i=1 xi = X̄. However, if the national
government sets a binding ceiling price, pN = p̄, the national tender volume is not fully exploited,∑n
i=1 xi < X̄. This implies that the national government effectively resorts to Price regulation.
National and state-level policy choices are again rationalized as under Price & Price regulation
(cf. eq. (9) and (11)). Consequently, in equilibrium state governments take national RE




the underlying incentive structure of state policy is again oriented towards states’ population
shares. The national government may choose a binding ceiling price – to bring about this de
facto regime shift from national Quantity to national Price regulation – if existing burden shares
correspond to population shares. In that case a binding ceiling price may likely induce a rather
efficient spatial allocation of RE deployment, as state policies are more properly incentivized.
However, this comes at the cost of falling short of the preferred nationwide RE expansion level.
In the next section we show that states’ strategic incentives again change with altering the
policy instrument assigned to the state layer.
4.2.2 Regulatory Design IV: Quantity & Quantity
Under Quantity & Quantity regulation the market clearing condition may not apply in equilib-
rium, namely, when the sum of state-level quantity caps
∑n
i=1 x̄i is smaller than the national
tender volume X̄. To analyze the equilibrium outcome we need to distinguish between an
equilibrium where
∑n
i=1 x̄i > X̄ (Case A), and an equilibrium where
∑n
i=1 x̄i ≤ X̄ (Case R).
The distinction of Case A and Case R is analogous to the distinction of cases under Price &
Quantity regulation in Section 4.1.2. In Case A the national tender volume is binding as at least
11The latter does not matter in (Meya & Neetzow, 2019) since they make the simplifying assumption – expressed
in our model terms – that ∂
2Ci
∂x2i
is identical across all states.
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one state exerts ambitious policy by setting a non-binding quantity cap, xa < x̄a. The market
clearing condition applies,
∑n
i=1 xi = X̄, and thus the clearing price is competitively determined
and below the ceiling price, pN < p̄. In Case R the national tender volume is not binding, but
each state pursues restrictive policies by setting a binding quantity cap, xi = x̄i ∀i. Notice that
in Case R suppliers do not face any competition in the tendering procedure (in the second stage
of the game) since all submitted bids are awarded. This means in all states suppliers bid at the
ceiling price, pN = p̄, and fully exploit quantity caps, xi = x̄i ∀i.
Whether in equilibrium Case A or Case R applies depends on the choice of the national
tender volume X̄, and the choice of the ceiling price p̄. For the purpose of analysis, we first
assume that the national government does not set a binding ceiling price as long as the national
tender volume alone is binding, i. e.
∑n
i=1 x̄i > X̄. This means that the national government
allows pN to be determined competitively through tenders if possible. Then the choice of X̄
alone defines whether Case A or Case R applies.
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Analogous to Price & Quantity regulation, there must exist a threshold level X̂ such that in
equilibrium
∑n
i=1 x̄i > X̄ for X̄ ∈ (0, X̂), and
∑n
i=1 x̄i ≤ X̄ for X̄ ≥ X̂. This relationship is illus-
trated in Figure 2. When the national government sets X̄ < X̂ (left-hand range), the aggregate
state-level quantity cap (dashed orange line) exceeds the national tender volume,
∑n
i=1 x̄i > X̄.
Here, nationwide RE deployment is equal to the national tender volume,
∑n
i=1 xi = X̄ (or-
ange 45° line). When the national government sets X̄ ≥ X̂ (right-hand range), the aggregate
state-level quantity cap is smaller or equal to the national tender volume,
∑n
i=1 x̄i ≤ X̄. Now,
the level of the ceiling price determines the aggregate state-level quantity cap which lies within





Before analyzing the two cases, note that the suppliers’ deployment decisions are analogous
to those under Price & Quantity regulation. That is, suppliers either expand RE deployment
until marginal power production cost equate national RE support (see eq. (24a)), which is true
given ambitious state policy. Or, suppliers expand RE deployment until the quantity cap is






if xi < x̄i
≥ ∂Ci
∂xi
if xi = x̄i
(24a)
(24b)
Case A: X̄ < X̂
If in equilibrium the sum of states’ quantity caps exceeds the national tender volume,
∑n
i=1 x̄i >
X̄, then national RE support resp. the clearing price pN is competitively determined through
the tendering procedure.12 Actual nationwide RE deployment is fixed to X = X̄ and thus
∂X
∂x̄i








+ pN (x) +
∂pN
∂xi
(xi − γiX̄) = 0 ∀i (25)
As eq. (25) depicts, in Case A state governments’ policy choices are identically rationalized as
under Quantity & Price regulation (cf. eq. (20)). For restrictive states, where x̄r = xr and
pN ≥ ∂Cr∂xr , an increase of the quantity cap leads to a decrease in the national clearing price
∂pN
∂xr
< 0. By expanding its quantity cap a restrictive state lowers the clearing price because
additional RE deployment with marginal power production cost below the clearing price level is
unlocked to participate in national tenders. For ambitious states, where x̄a > xa and p
N = ∂Ca∂xa ,
an increase of the quantity cap effectively does neither change regional RE deployment nor the
national clearing price ∂p
N
∂xa




In the equilibrium of Case A at least one ambitious state sets a non-binding quantity cap xj < x̄j
such that pN =
∂Cj(xj)
∂xj
. Therefore, eq. (25) implicitly excludes an equilibrium if in all states
marginal external regional costs are always positive, ∂Di∂xi > 0 ∀i, because then no state would






< 1. Thus, increasing X̄ must lead to
∑n
i=1 x̄i = X̄ at some level of X̄ (see Figure
2).13
For the national government we derive the equilibrium choice X̄ by differentiating the na-
tional welfare function eq. (1) w.r.t. X, inserting (25) for restrictive states and eq. (24a) for
12Further below, we also analyze the possibility that the national government chooses a binding ceiling price,
though tenders would competitively determine a clearing price for the preferred amount of nationwide RE expan-
sion.
13See Appendix D. Note that the threshold level X̂ varies with the exogenous parameters including states’
burden shares. Think of Figure 2 as illustrating X̂ given a certain burden sharing, e.g. γi =
x∗i
X∗ ∀i or γi = ηi ∀i.
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If in equilibrium the clearing price is competitively determined, on the one hand, the national
RE support under Quantity & Quantity regulation is similarly defined to national RE support
under Quantity & Price regulation (cf. eq. (23)). On the other hand, the level of national
RE support adjusts to regional externalities in ambitious states like under Price & Quantity
regulation (cf. eq. (17)).
Case R: X̄ > X̂
If in equilibrium all state governments establish an aggregate quantity cap as large as or less
than the national tender volume,
∑n
i=1 x̄i ≤ X̄, then the clearing price is no longer competitively
determined. X̄ is not binding, but instead all state-level quantity caps are binding, xi = x̄i ∀i.
Thereby, in the second stage of the game the aggregate demand for national subsidies is con-
strained to be equal to or lower than the supply offered through the national tender volume.
Hence, suppliers are always rewarded within the tendering procedure, and therefore they bid at
the ceiling price. The clearing price being equal to the ceiling price, pN = p̄, eventually implies




i=1 xi only depends on the level of p̄.
State governments anticipate that in equilibrium pN = p̄ which is effectively equivalent to
an administratively fixed national price incentive (as under Price regulation at the national
layer). State governments also anticipate that altering quantity caps changes nationwide RE
deployment, ∂X∂x̄i = 1. Given this, deriving state i’s equilibrium policy x̄i by differentiating eq.
(2) w.r.t. xi and setting
∂Wi
∂xi
= 0, we arrive at the same state-level policy choices as in the
presence of solely restrictive state policies under Price & Quantity regulation (see eq. (13)).
The national government’s choice of the ceiling price is consequently identical to the choice of
national RE support under Price & Quantity regulation (see eq. (11)).
In a type-B nation the social optimum can neither ensue in an equilibrium of Case A nor
in an equilibrium of Case R. This is for the same reason as under Price & Quantity regulation
(see Section 4.1.2). In a type-D nation the social optimum can only ensue in an equilibrium of
Case R. Since in Case R Quantity & Quantity regulation de facto resembles Price & Quantity
regulation, efficiency condition and equilibrium policies are also the same.
Proposition 4. Under Quantity & Quantity regulation the social optimum is only attainable
in a type-D nation. Here, Quantity & Quantity regulation is efficient, if and only if the states’
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burden shares are defined by γi = ηi ∀i. The equilibrium policies are X̄ ≥ X∗ and x̄i = x∗i ∀i,
and the clearing price is equal to the ceiling price, pN = p̄ = ∂B∂X .
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Proof: See Appendix D.
Finally, we consider the strategic use of the ceiling price given that a formal shift to price-
based regulation is precluded (analogous to our analysis in Section 4.2.1). So far, we assumed
that the national government solely sets a binding ceiling price in conjunction with those levels
of the national tender volume for which no competition among suppliers ensues, X̄ ≥ X̂ (right-
hand range in Figure 2). Of course, the national government may also set a binding ceiling
price in combination with a level of the national tender volume that would otherwise allow for
a competitive determination of the national clearing price, X̄ < X̂ (left-hand range in Figure
2). Regarding the latter, setting a binding ceiling price means that the tender volume is not
binding anymore,
∑n
i=1 xi < X̄, and the national government de facto exerts Price regulation.
This may be reasonable, although nationwide RE deployment is reduced below a preferred
expansion level. For example, assume that states’ burden shares are in fact specified by γi = ηi ∀i
and that X∗ < X̂ (hence the social optimum is not attainable). Furthermore, assume that a
competitively determined clearing price would settle at pN > ∂B∂X . In this case, it may be
reasonable that the national government chooses p̄ = ∂B∂X because then the binding ceiling
price would at least induce first-best RE expansion levels in all restrictive states. Still, some
states would enact ambitious policies and within their jurisdictions RE deployment would be
inefficiently low. However, in total the national welfare loss due to inefficiently low nationwide
RE deployment may be outweighed by welfare gains due to more efficient spatial allocation of
RE deployment.
In other words, there is a trade-off for the national government between setting a binding
ceiling price or not that depends on states’ actual burden shares: an inefficiently low level of
nationwide RE expansion that is spatially rather efficiently allocated versus an efficiently high
level of nationwide RE expansion that is spatially inefficiently allocated. The degree of spatial
efficiency depends on states’ actual burden shares and how these burden shares shape incentives
for state-level policies in Case A and Case R. For example, if states’ actual burden shares are
roughly specified by γi =
x∗i
X∗ ∀i, then the national government more likely restrains from setting
a binding ceiling price since under competitive tenders (X∗ < X̂) this burden sharing at least
induces restrictive states to implement quite efficient expansion levels.
14With regard to Figure 2, the social optimum is attainable as long as X∗ ≥ X̂. Note that the level of X̂ is
depending on γ1, ...γn. Therefore, to be precise the social optimum is attainable, if X
∗ ≥ X̂ for γi = ηi ∀i. If





< 0, then analogous to Price & Quantity regulation the social
optimum is still attainable, and then it is implemented through adjusted burden shares as shown in Appendix D.










4.3 Comparison of Regulatory Designs
We summarize our results by comparing whether and under which conditions the four regulatory
designs implement the social optimum.
Firstly, we conclude that the first-best allocation of RE deployment is not always attainable
under all regulatory designs. In fact, it is crucial whether at the social optimum for at least
one state additional regional RE deployment provides regional benefits (type-B nation), or con-
versely, whether all states experience only regional disamenities from RE deployment (type-D
nation). In a type-B nation the social optimum is only attainable under regulatory designs I
and III where price instruments are assigned to the state layer. In a type-D nation the social
optimum is attainable under all four regulatory designs.


















social optimum not attainable type-B nation
γ∗i = ηi γ
∗
i = ηi type-D nation
Secondly, given the social optimum is attainable we identified efficiency conditions which
ensure that the social optimum is implemented in equilibrium, see Table 2. These efficiency
conditions refer to the optimal specification of states’ burden shares γ∗. In a type-B nation
specification of efficient burden shares varies with the policy instrument at the national layer.
If a price instrument is assigned to the national layer, then states’ burden shares must equate
states’ population shares, γ∗i = ηi ∀i. If a quantity instrument is assigned to the national layer,
then states’ burden shares should equate states’ first-best deployment shares, γ∗i =
x∗i
X∗ ∀i. The
latter also holds for a type-D nation. In contrast, for all other regulatory designs in a type-D
nation states’ burden shares should again equate states’ population shares, γ∗i = ηi ∀i.
These diverging efficiency conditions result from diverging incentives for states’ policy choices
under the different regulatory designs. Under national Price regulation states act according to
the same incentives, no matter which policy instrument is assigned to the state layer (states’
first-order conditions are identical, cf. eq. (8) and (13)). Merely the channel through which
states benefit from national support payments alters with the state-level policy instrument.
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Under state-level Price regulation states are compensated for their regional disamenities through
public revenues collected via negative price incentives such as state-specific levies or taxes. Under
state-level Quantity regulation states are compensated through higher profits for electricity
suppliers via national RE remunerations exceeding marginal power production costs. Under both
regulatory designs each state needs to be incentivized to internalize the positive interregional
externalities that arise from RE deployment within its own jurisdiction. Accordingly, for these
regulatory designs efficiency conditions are identical and oriented towards states’ population
shares.15
Under national Quantity regulation incentives for states may vary with the policy instrument
assigned to the state layer. Under state-level Price regulation state policies only affect the level
of national RE support but not the level of nationwide RE expansion. Accordingly, states
consider whether they benefit or lose from a change in the national support level. For each
state this, in turn, depends on the ratio of RE deployment in a state’s jurisdiction compared
to nationwide RE deployment. Therefore, efficient burden sharing is oriented towards this
ratio. Under state-level Quantity regulation in Case A (restrictive) states equally affect the
national support level and face similar incentives. However, in Case R under state-level Quantity
regulation states act according to the same incentives as under national Price regulation. Here,
efficient burden sharing is thus oriented towards states’ population shares. Consequently, under
national Quantity regulation shifting from state-level Price to Quantity regulation may change
incentives for states’ policy choices. In fact, in a type-D nation shifting from state-level Price to
Quantity regulation always changes efficiency conditions from oriented towards RE deployment
shares to oriented towards population shares (bottom row in Table 2).
5 Discussion
In the following we deduce several policy implications from our main results that are particularly
important for regime shifts, meaning changes in policy instruments assigned to the national or
state layer. Subsequently, we discuss limitations of our model and point out to areas of further
research.
Policy Implications
In the following, it is especially instructive to evaluate some real world examples against the
background of our model results. Firstly, we look at levy-based financing schemes that are
widely observed in practice. In the beginning most national support schemes were set up as
feed-in tariffs (national Price regulation) and financed through levies imposed on the electric-
ity price paid by all (or most) electricity consumers (Council of European Energy Regulators,





< 0 is true for exactly
one state. See Appendix B for the adjusted efficiency conditions in this case. Of course, the above applies for
type-D nations, i.e. if the social optimum is also attainable under Price & Quantity regulation.
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2018).16 Effectively, a levy-based system establishes that the share of national subsidy costs
borne by a subnational jurisdiction (e.g. state) closely corresponds to its population share. For
example, in Germany burden shares of the Bundesländer (German states) almost reflect their
population shares (see Table 3). Based on our results and referring to countries where regional
externalities of RE deployment are mostly negative (as in type-D nations), we conclude that
the implementation of levy-based financing schemes together with a regulatory design of na-
tional Price regulation yields efficient federal co-regulation. This holds regardless of the policy
instrument assigned to the subnational layer.
Secondly, we look at national quantity-based regulation that gains currency as recently many
countries, including various EU member states, have shifted national support from Price to
Quantity regulation (REN21, 2019; Council of European Energy Regulators, 2018).17 From
our results we know that a shift from national Price to national Quantity regulation requires
to reconfigure burden shares along regional shares of first-best RE deployment if subnational
authorities (e.g. states) regulate through price incentives. Our analysis shows that such national
policy reforms imply that federal co-regulation becomes inefficient if levy-funding continues to be
proportional to population shares. In these cases another financing scheme needs to distribute
burden shares along first-best RE deployment shares.
For Germany (where this regime shift took place in 2017) we find significant differences among
states’ population shares and states’ first-best RE deployment shares (see Table 3), indicating to
possible inefficiencies if burden shares are not adjusted. Our results regarding a switch from Price
& Price regulation to Quantity & Price regulation confirm the findings by (Meya & Neetzow,
2019) who analyze the reaction of state policies caused by such a regime shift. States with a
higher (lower) actual burden share than their first-best RE deployment share set inefficiently
high (low) state-specific price incentives. Accordingly, for example Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW)
would set too high price incentives, whereas Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (MWP) would set
too low price incentives.18
16Most European countries finance their national support schemes through non-tax levies that are calculated in
proportion to people’s electricity consumption. In 2017, 21 out of 27 EU member states funded their RE support
schemes through non-tax levies (Council of European Energy Regulators, 2018). Electricity consumption per
region is roughly proportional to population per region, especially, if energy-intensive companies are (partially)
exempted from paying levies, like in Germany.
17These regime shifts mainly aimed at reductions of national subsidy costs. After the passage of the EU’s
Renewable Energy Directive in 2009, countries like France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands or UK introduced tender
schemes to comply with the requirements of higher competitiveness and cost-effectiveness (Council of European
Energy Regulators, 2018). Worldwide more countries rely on RE support schemes with tendering procedures, e.g.
Brazil, China, India, South Africa (for an overview see Grashof et al., 2020).
18The results by (Meya & Neetzow, 2019) rest upon the assumption that spatial allocation of nationwide RE
deployment matters for marginal benefits from emissions reduction. In our model terms, (Meya & Neetzow,
2019) assume that benefits from emissions reduction are state-specific, Bi(·), and that ∂
2Bj
∂X∂xi
≤ 0, j 6= i. Our
model refrains from this assumption such that additional RE deployment in any location generates the same
marginal nationwide benefit. While we abstract from state-specific benefits of nationwide emissions reduction,
B(·), and (Meya & Neetzow, 2019) take this into account, Bi(·). While they assume that ∂
2Ci
∂x2i
= c ∀i, we allow
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Table 3 Comparison of actual and efficient burden shares of the German states (Bundesländer) in the
case of onshore wind energy deployment
Actual Population Share Actual Burden Share
Simulated First-Best
Expansion Share
State η γ x
∗
X∗
BW 0.1333 0.1430 0.0000
BY 0.1575 0.1588 0.0151
BE 0.0439 0.0245 0.0000
BB 0.0303 0.0310 0.2020
HB 0.0082 0.0091 0.0000
HH 0.0222 0.0229 0.0000
HE 0.0755 0.0750 0.0286
MWP 0.0194 0.0145 0.3128
NN 0.0962 0.1035 0.1868
NRW 0.2160 0.2230 0.0047
RP 0.0492 0.0532 0.0098
SL 0.0119 0.0171 0.0000
SN 0.0491 0.0433 0.0419
ST 0.0266 0.0310 0.1214
SH 0.0349 0.0241 0.0409
TH 0.0258 0.0261 0.0361
Notes: See Appendix E.
However, these results only hold as long as subnational governments regulate through price
incentives, but the result changes if they co-regulate by quantity caps. In fact, like in Germany,
it is more common that subnational governments regulate through quantity-based approaches,
i.e. spatial planning, than through price incentives (Keenleyside et al., 2009; Pettersson et al.,
2010; Power & Cowell, 2012). So thirdly, we show that eventual welfare implications crucially de-
pend on whether subnational governments co-regulate by price or quantity instruments. Under
certain conditions levy-based funding schemes remain efficient even after a national regime shift:
in type-D nations a shift from national price-based regulation (Price & Quantity) to national
quantity-based regulation (Quantity & Quantity) does not call for reconfigured burden sharing.
Countries like Germany may reasonably be seen as type-D nations since here a growing number
of local conflicts related to the deployment of large-scale RE plants indicates to predominantly
negative externalities (e.g. noise impacts, landscape degradation, threats to protected species).







∀i, j. In addition, our model recognizes the interplay of state-specific effectiveness of national
policy ∂xi
∂pN





ment that unlikely offset regional disamenities (Brown et al., 2012; Többen, 2017; Mauritzen,
2020). For these type-D nations funding schemes should continue to distribute states’ burden
shares along states’ population shares.
Fourthly, our findings square with the development of submitted bids and clearing prices in
tender rounds for wind energy deployment in Germany since 2017. Supposing that in Germany






, our model results suggest that
in equilibrium we would find
∑n
i=1 x̄i ≤ X̄, meaning that German states (Bundesländer) provide
less building land for RE deployment than is promoted by national tenders (see Case R in Section
4.2.2). As we explained before, then the clearing price settles at the level of the ceiling price
because suppliers face no competition in national tenders. Indeed, since 2018 underprovision of
available construction sites and a clearing price in national tenders that reaches the ceiling price
level are observed for wind energy deployment (Meier et al., 2019; German Environment Agency,
2019).19 Moreover, following the implications of our model, German federal co-regulation of
onshore wind energy deployment could be considered as efficiently coordinated among federal
layers if the national government would set the efficient tender volume and ceiling price. Of
course, the observed development of wind energy expansion in Germany also originates in other
factors, e.g. legal complaints against approvals for wind energy deployment (Grashof et al.,
2020), and evidently nationwide onshore wind energy expansion falls short of a socially optimal
level when merely 1 GW is installed in 2019.20
We have thus demonstrated that in type-D nations like Germany a national regime shift does
not change the efficiency condition. In contrast, in type-B nations where subnational entities





< 0 ∃j) a shift
from national price-based to national quantity-based regulation may indeed call for readjusted
burden shares (see Case A in Section 4.2.2). Incentives for subnational governments are no longer
oriented towards population shares but towards RE deployment shares. Although the social
optimum is not attainable, adjusting burden shares may improve coordination among national
and subnational governments. If burden shares cannot be modified (e.g. due to constitutional
constraints), the national government may also choose a binding ceiling price in order to render
spatial RE allocation more efficiently. As explained in Section 4.2.2, this would improve the
coordination with subnational policies but would come at cost of an inefficiently low nationwide
19Although the German tender scheme is designed as a pay-as-you-bid auction, average winning bids have
reached the ceiling price quasi in all auction rounds since the beginning of 2018 (Federal Network Agency, 2020).
20Furthermore, state-level policies might be too restrictive. This might be reasoned by the problem to provide
(local) citizen-based RE projects (e.g. cooperatives) to have a fair chance in national tenders. Whereas in
the case of cooperatives remuneration payments benefit people on site, main shares of remunerations may flow
to other regions when non-local suppliers realize RE projects. With respect to our model this translates to a
modified assumption that allows for suppliers to deploy RE in other states and to spatially disentangle profits
and RE deployment. In fact, in Germany and other countries this is an upcoming argument for the assignment
of a price instrument to the subnational layer, because contrary to spatial planning price-based regulation can
still compensate subnational jurisdictions for their regional disamenities (see e.g. Kerr, Johnson, & Weir, 2017;
Jørgensen et al., 2020).
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RE expansion level.
Lastly, since in many countries a switch from quantity-based to price-based regulation at
the subnational layer is discussed, we point out to its policy implications. For example, in
Germany a (at least partial) shift from subnational Quantity to Price regulation is foreseeable
as the public debate on compensation schemes for communities with large-scale wind power and
PV deployment goes on. In other countries some forms of subnational price instruments are
already established (Rodi, 2017; Kerr et al., 2017; Jørgensen et al., 2020). In most countries
a subnational regime shift would occur under national quantity-based regulation (i.e. tender
schemes) and given predominantly negative regional externalities (type-D nations). In this
context, we emphasize that a subnational shift from quantity-based to price-based regulation
does alter incentives for subnational RE policies, such that subnational governments become
concerned about their RE deployment shares. Furthermore, in type-B nations this subnational
regime shift could increase national welfare, if at the same time the financing scheme is modified
such that burden shares are oriented towards first-best RE deployment shares. Depending on
which subnational tier holds regulatory power (e.g. state or community level), burden shares of
course would need to be tailored to the respective jurisdictions.
Generally, it should be noted that what we refer to as ’states’ within the model equiva-
lently applies to other subnational entities like provinces or municipalities. For some countries,
referring to lower subnational layers may even more properly account for who is in charge of
subnational RE policies, e.g. in Sweden municipalities decide on the designation of wind energy
areas (Lauf et al., 2020). Hence, our results are similarly applicable to federal co-regulation
that is carried on by a national and a regional (or local) layer, and implications from our model
generally pertain to RE policies in federally structured countries.
Model Limitations
Our model results rely upon some main assumptions that need to be scrutinized. Firstly, we
set up our model with perfectly informed policy-makers at the national and state layer. Conse-
quently, information asymmetry among national and subnational policymakers is not taken into
account. A more realistic setting would include that policymakers on lower federal layers are
better informed about regional external costs and benefits than policymakers on higher federal
layers. In fact, this is a standard argument of the fiscal federalism literature in favor of subsidiar-
ity (Oates, 1999). If information about regional costs and benefits is not (perfectly) available
at the national layer, our results imply that those regulatory designs are favorable where no
information about subnational preferences is needed to design national policies efficiently. This
is true for regulatory designs where efficient burden shares are equal to population shares (see
Table 2). As population shares are common knowledge and given that the national government
is enabled to control burden shares, it could still implement the social optimum under infor-
mation asymmetry. In contrast, under Quantity & Price regulation the condition on efficient
burden sharing relies on information about regional external costs (as knowledge about the first-
best allocation of RE deployment is required). In this case, an imperfectly informed national
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government would be unable to implement the first-best allocation. In this regard, regulatory
designs with state-level spatial planning are (in the case of type-D nations) less demanding with
respect to information requirements than Quantity & Price regulation.
Another simplification based on the assumption of perfect information concerns the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of price and quantity instruments. As power production costs are
actually private information of suppliers, neither public actors (exactly) know them, nor is every
supplier perfectly informed about power production costs of competing suppliers. In point of
fact, recently observed regime shifts to national tender schemes are mainly motivated by the
objective to elicit information on true power production costs (Gephart et al., 2017; Grashof
et al., 2020). In our setting this advantageous feature of market-based quantity instruments
is not reflected. Simultaneously possible merits of price instruments, like strengthening small
(community-owned) and more risk-averse suppliers, are neither recognized. The focus of this
work was rather upon the strategic interactions of governmental actors.
Secondly, we assume that there is a single electricity supplier in each state and that its
economic activities are limited to the respective state. We thereby abstract from competition
among suppliers for building land. Although sites for RE plants are coveted, many suppliers
acquire sites in a first-come-first-serve manner rather than in competition with other opponents.
Commonly, suppliers already sign land-use contracts with landowners and secure construction
permits issued by regional authorities before other parties enter the stage. Nonetheless, the
assumption of one supplier per jurisdiction implies that subsidies completely benefit the corre-
sponding jurisdiction – either via profits of the regional supplier, or via subnational levies on
regional RE deployment. In reality, of course, often suppliers from other jurisdictions own RE
plants such that national remunerations for RE deployment do not fully flow into the jurisdiction
where RE are deployed. The ongoing debate on financial benefits for communities where RE
plants are situated mirrors this fact. Here, further research may scrutinize the possible effects of
other design options within federal regulation, like actor-specific national support schemes that
promote local ownership of RE projects.21
Thirdly, we model national and subnational RE policies in a simplified manner. We assume
national policy to be spatially uniform. In practice, national governments mainly steer spatial
allocation of RE deployment through financial incentives, e.g. national support schemes. If a
national government can spatially differentiate RE remuneration, the first-best allocation would
be always implemented in a perfect information setting. However, even though national support
schemes partly include elements of spatial differentiation22, the latter is often restricted because
national subsidy policies (must) pursue further policy goals like cost-effectiveness and competi-
tiveness23. Naturally, the toolbox of national governments contains more instruments like rules
21This design option intends to accrue national RE remunerations for RE deployment to residents.
22E.g. in Germany regional adjustment of remuneration and regional control of awards are in place. However,
they do not have a significant steering effect on spatial distribution of wind energy (Grashof et al., 2020; Lauf et
al., 2020).
23Among others, these are prescribed for EU member states in the EU Renewable Energy Directive, see
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of planning law, building law, energy law, etc. Through these channels a national government
additionally sets the scope for subsequent governmental layers and constrains their policy dis-
cretion. However, such complementary regulation generally imposes uniform requirements on
subnational decision-making.
With regard to subnational policy instruments, within our model we obviously simplify elab-
orate spatial planning procedures when expressing them by means of expansion limits (quantity
caps). Yet, this formalization captures the essential feature of spatial planning policy, namely
the provision of building area for large-scale RE (Keenleyside et al., 2009; Pettersson et al., 2010;
Power & Cowell, 2012). If, as seen for example for Germany, regional authorities enact restrictive
policies, then the provision of available sites already determines actual regional RE deployment
(Meier et al., 2019). To put it in model terms, since regional disamenities dominate regional
benefits, subnational governments set binding quantity caps and suppliers fully exploit regional
RE expansion possibilities. Admittedly, soft policy measures by subnational governments may
ease or hamper RE deployment for suppliers by supporting planning or approval procedures,
and may be better formalized by means of subnational implicit price incentives. But within our
model24 subnational price incentives do not reflect these transaction costs imposed through sub-
national planning or permission requirements. In contrast, within our model subnational price
incentives spend or generate public revenues of subnational jurisdictions. Therefore, within our
model setup we shall think of subnational prices as explicit levies or taxes on RE deployment.
In fact, there are some variants of such price instruments (e.g. in Germany, Denmark, or Spain),
though up to date they rarely take actual steering effect on location decisions for RE deployment
(Iglesias et al., 2011; Jørgensen et al., 2020).
Fourthly, we assume homogeneous benefits from nationwide emissions reductions for all
regions. Despite geographical variation of climate change mitigation benefits, or in other words,
spatially heterogeneous social cost of carbon (Ricke et al., 2018), we leave this distinction aside
for subnational regions for reasons of clarity. However, if we account for heterogeneous benefits
at the subnational level (as in (Williams III, 2012) and (Meya & Neetzow, 2019)), our main
messages change only in the sense that population shares need to be complemented by region-
specific benefits. More importantly, results may be substantially altered if the assumed shape
of subutility functions fails to reflect reality. Marginal benefits from emissions reductions may
possibly not decrease monotonically because RE-based electricity production does not necessarily
substitute those fossil-based electricity producers which are most CO2-intensive. Whether CO2-
intensive power plants are actually the first to be crowded out is rather determined by the
merit order of power plants, i.e. marginal power production costs of fossil electricity producers.
Likewise, functions of regional disamenities may exhibit kinks at certain thresholds. We also
supposed that the site with lowest power production cost concurrently exhibits lowest regional
disamenities, such that marginal regional disamenities and marginal power production cost are
monotonically increasing in each jurisdiction. This relationship is more likely, the smaller is
(European Union, 2018).
24This is also true for the model setup in (Williams III, 2012) and in (Meya & Neetzow, 2019).
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the considered administrative unit, and thus must be taken into account especially at the state
or province level. Regarding our numerical example of the first-best allocation of wind energy
deployment in Germany, we find that deviations from this assumed relationship are negligible
for the level of the Bundesländer.
Fifthly, we abstract from the complex process of policy formation in a multi-level system
where national policy is often influenced by political actors of all federal layers. National leg-
islation may demand for multi-level agreements, or subnational governments may put pressure
on the national government when deciding about national RE support (Strunz et al., 2016).
Nonetheless, in federal systems exertion of influence is also restricted by constitutional division
of competences or majority rules. For example in Germany state governments are entitled to
formally comment decisions by the national government concerning financial RE support, but
they cannot veto the national government’s decision.25 Our static framework also simplifies the
dynamics of a socio-technical transformation process. Policy setting of national and subnational
governments takes place within longer time frames. Changes in the national support level or in
the regional provision of RE expansion areas are made at larger time intervals. Still, we think
that analyzing the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous move game of federal co-regulation may
adequately represent successive and mutually responding policy adjustments of national and
subnational governments.
Finally, within our model the regulatory design of federal co-regulation, including the assign-
ment of policy instruments and the specification of burden shares, is assumed to be exogenous.
Though, the national government is usually in charge of designing the RE financing scheme,
empirically it seems to be a constant across time and countries (Council of European Energy
Regulators, 2018). Therefore, when making their policy choices on prices or quantities, gov-
ernments of all federal layers may regard the financing scheme, respectively subnational burden
sharing, as at least temporarily given. If the national government can decide on subnational
burden sharing, our analysis shows that current financing schemes are likely well chosen. If,
realistically, the national government can choose between price-based and quantity-based in-
struments, our results reveal that the optimal choice depends on instruments applied at the
subnational layer. For subnational layers the assumption of assigned policy instruments may be
valid, depending on the competences (and policy fields) that are constitutionally designated to
them. Certainly, this endogeneity of the regulatory design as well as implications of instrument
choices for distributive issues among regions need further research.
25Furthermore, in particular a transition to a RE-based electricity sector needs sufficient stakeholder support,
and therefore offers many opportunities for stakeholder groups to shape regulation policies in their interests.
Hence, RE policy has to take into account the potential redistribution of resources among interest groups (Gawel
et al., 2017; del Ŕıo & Labandeira, 2009). Apart from ”rent management” within RE policy (Schmitz et al.,
2013), also policy choices as well as the choice of regulatory instruments can be ascribed to rent-seeking behavior
of different interest groups (Kirchgässner & Schneider, 2003).
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6 Conclusion
What combination of policy instruments should be assigned to different federal layers to attain
an efficient allocation of RE deployment? We answer this question by using a simple two-level
regulation model of federal RE policies. We analyze strategic interactions between national
and subnational RE regulation under different combinations of price and quantity instruments.
Our analysis extends the existing (theoretical) literature on federal RE regulation by including
subnational quantity-based regulation, i.e. spatial planning. The focus on spatial planning is
crucial as it is the standard policy instrument of subnational regulation of RE deployment.
Since subnational governments effectively pick siting areas for RE deployment, we formalize
spatial planing policies through ’quantity caps’ that implement an upper limit on regional RE
deployment.
Efficiency of federal co-regulation hinges upon how the financial burden of the national RE
support scheme is shared among subnational jurisdictions. Under realistic assumptions national
price-based regulation is efficient if burden shares of subnational jurisdictions are proportional to
their population shares. This holds regardless of the subnational policy instrument. Contrary,
under national quantity-based regulation efficient burden sharing depends on the policy instru-
ment assigned to the subnational layer. Given subnational price-based combined with national
quantity-based regulation burden shares should be oriented towards first-best RE deployment
shares. Given subnational quantity-based combined with national quantity-based regulation
burden shares should be oriented towards population shares. These findings apply under the
realistic assumption that regional disamenities outweigh regional benefits from RE deployment.
As an example, we show that for Germany the assignment of the subnational policy instrument
substantially alters the efficient specification of subnational burden sharing.
Notwithstanding, the present work leaves aside other relevant aspects of multi-level policy
coordination which may merit further research. It might be of further interest to consider en-
dogenous instrument choice as well as an analysis of welfare distribution among subnational
jurisdictions (Böhringer et al., 2015). In our work we also abstract from instrument-specific ef-
fects. To quote only two, the application of price-based versus quantity-based instruments affects
the cost-effectiveness of RE support schemes (Gephart et al., 2017) as well as the plurality of
actors (i.e. the chances of success for certain groups of investors) (Grashof, 2019). Thus, quan-
tity instruments (e.g. tender schemes) may reduce national subsidy costs while they may crowd
out small citizen-owned projects. Both the reduction of national subsidy costs and (financial)
citizen participation are political objectives pursued by national and subnational governments.
As both objectives play a significant role for the success of future RE deployment, including




i = 1, ..., n Index for states
r Index for ’restrictive’ states
a Index for ’ambitious’ states
ηi State i’s population share
γi State i’s burden share of national subsidy costs
xi Amount of electricity produced by RE in state i
x̄i state-level quantity cap
X Nationwide amount of electricity produced from RE
pN National remuneration per unit of electricity from RE
pSi State-level price incentive per unit of electricity from RE in state i
p̄ Ceiling price in tenders for national remuneration per unit of electricity from RE
X̄ National tender volume
Ci(xi) Cost of electricity production by RE in state i
Di(xi) Net regional external costs (and benefits) of RE deployment in state i
B(X) Nationwide benefit from nationwide RE deployment
Appendix A Price & Price regulation
In the first stage, national and state-level governments decide on their policy choices. In the
second stage, in each state the supplier decides on its RE deployment given the policy choices.
We solve each regulation outcome by backward induction. First, we derive the first-order con-
ditions for all electricity suppliers. Second, we derive the equilibrium strategies of national and
state-level governments.
Electricity Suppliers




N + pSi )xi + Ci(xi) ∀i (A.1)
Each supplier chooses RE deployment according to:




RE deployment in state i is implicitly defined as a function of national and state-level price
incentives, xi(p
N , pSi ).
State-level Policy
Taking pN as given, the marginal change in xi caused by a marginal increase in state i’s price






∀i. We derive state i’s policy choice of pSi given the national
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policy pN by differentiating state i’s welfare function eq. (2) w.r.t. pSi and setting the result
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+ (1− γi)pN = 0 ∀i (A.4)
National Policy















We derive the national government’s policy choice of pN by differentiating the national welfare










































Proof of Proposition 1





Plugging γi = ηi ∀i and eq. (A.8) into eq. (A.4) gives the state governments’ policy choices of







Substituting eq. (A.8) and eq. (A.9) into eq. (A.2) yields the social optimum, (cf. eq. (4).
Q.E.D.
36
Appendix B Price & Quantity regulation
Electricity Suppliers




Nxi + Ci(xi) s.t. xi ≤ x̄i ∀i (B.1)






∧ xi < x̄i
≥ ∂Ci
∂xi
∧ xi = x̄i
(B.2a)
(B.2b)
RE deployment in state i is implicitly defined as a function of either the national price incentive,
xi(p
N ), or the state-level quantity cap, xi(x̄i).
State-level Policy
We assume that each state sets its quantity cap equal to its welfare maximizing RE expansion
level, hence x̄i = arg max
xi
Wi(xi). Taking pN as given, state i’s choice is implicitly defined by













+ (1− γi)pN = 0 ∀i (B.3)
State-level policy in state i is implicitly defined as a function of the national price incentive,
x̄i(p
N ). State governments prefer the same RE deployment as under Price & Price regulation
(cf. eq. (8)). Differentiating eq. (B.3) w.r.t. pN and rearranging gives:
∂x̄i
∂pN









Proof of Lemma 1




. If in the
second stage the electricity supplier chooses to deploy less RE than state i’s quantity cap allows,








, then this implies that state i prefers
more RE deployment than is realized by the electricity supplier. In this case we say state i
pursues an ambitious policy.
If the electricity supplier in state i exhausts the quantity cap, hence if xESi ≥ x̄i, then it must






. The latter inequality means that the electricity supplier
strives for at least as much RE deployment in state i as state i’s government favors. In that
case we say state i pursues a restrictive policy.
We define that state governments pursue ambitious or restrictive policies in equilibrium by








+ (1− γi)pN ∀i (B.5)
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resp. if eq. (B.6) applies in equilibrium, then state i pursues an
ambitious policy.












− γi pN ≤ 0 (B.7)
Hence, if eq. (B.7) applies in equilibrium, then state i pursues a restrictive policy.
States that choose restrictive policies in equilibrium are indexed by r and states that choose
ambitious policies in equilibrium are indexed by a. The above definitions are summarized in
Lemma 1.
With increasing pN less states enact ambitious policies resp. more states enact restrictive










− γi < 0. Thus, the set of states that enact ambitious policies,
denoted by A, resp. the set of states that enact restrictive policies, denoted by R, is a func-
tion of pN . Furthermore, for each specification of states’ burden shares γ1, ..., γn there exists a
national support level p̂ such that, if pN ≥ p̂, then all state governments enact restrictive policies.
National Policy
We derive the national government’s policy choice of pN by differentiating the national welfare












































































Proof of Proposition 2a and Proposition 2b





> 0 ∀i, then all states
enact restrictive policies and first-best RE allocation is implemented: Suppose that the national
government sets pN = ∂B(X
∗)
∂X . Given γi = ηi ∀i, according to eq. (B.3) all state governments
set x̄i = x
∗
i ∀i. This implies that according to eq. (B.7) all states enact restrictive policies and
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hence xi = x
∗
i ∀i. Since in this way the social optimum is implemented, the national government
does not change its policy choice pN = ∂B(X
∗)
∂X in the first place.





< 0 ∃j, then at least
one state enacts ambitious policies (see Case A) and the social optimum is not implemented:











> 0 ∀i 6= j. For pN = ∂B(X
∗)
∂X the latter states would implement first-best
RE deployment within their states (see paragraph above). According to eq. (B.3) state j’s
government would set x̄j = x
∗













would follow that xj < x
∗
j . Therefore, by slightly increasing p










the national government could increase national welfare. Then according
to eq. (B.3) state governments set x̄i > x
∗
i ∀i 6= j, thus xi > x∗i ∀i 6= j and xj < x∗j . The social
optimum is not implemented.





< 0 applies, then
Price & Quantity regulation can still implement the social optimum: Suppose that γi = ηi ∀i.












(since state j enacts an ambitious policy, see previous paragraph).
Therefore, burden shares of all other (restrictive) states need to be adjusted to this level of pN .





in state j and















∀i 6= j (B.11)












∀i 6= j (B.12)
In comparison to Proposition 1, the burden shares of restrictive states are adjusted according











< 0, and the adjusted efficient burden shares of restrictive states are higher,
γi > ηi ∀i 6= j, the adjusted efficient burden share of the ambitious state is lower, γj < ηj , and
pN is higher, pN > ∂B(X
∗)
∂X , compared to Proposition 1. By configuring burden shares according
to eq. (B.12) the social optimum is implemented in equilibrium. However, this is only true if





< 0 solely applies for one state. If the latter applies for more
than one state, the social optimum is not attainable under Price & Quantity regulation. If





< 0, then by eq. (B.11) this would require that at the social










< 0. That is only true















Appendix C Quantity & Price regulation
The derivations in this section mostly resemble (Meya & Neetzow, 2019), pp. 29-31. In the
following we assume that p̄ > pN .
Electricity Suppliers
The suppliers’ optimization problem is the same as under Price & Price regulation. In contrast
to Price & Price regulation nationwide RE expansion is fixed through the tendering procedure
while the support level pN is endogenous. The equilibrium is defined as follows:






xi = X̄ (C.2)
According to eq. (C.1) regional RE deployment depends on pN and pSi , hence xi(p
N , pSi ). The
above equilibrium conditions implicitly define the clearing price as a function of the allocation
of RE deployment across states, pN (x). Accordingly, the clearing price also depends on the level
of nationwide RE deployment resp. the tender volume, X̄.






































Given the national policy choice X̄, nationwide RE expansion is fixed to X = X̄ and thus
∂X
∂xi
















= 0 ∀i (C.6)







+ pN (x) +
∂pN
∂xi
(xi − γiX̄) = 0 ∀i (C.7)
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(xi − γiX̄) ∀i (C.8)
∂pN
∂xi
is defined by eq. (C.4).
National Policy
We derive the national government’s equilibrium choice of X̄ by differentiating the national




















is defined by eq. (C.3) and ∂p
N
∂X̄



































(xi − γiX̄) = 0 (C.11)














Proof of Proposition 3





















(xi − γiX̄) ∀i (C.13)
If for all states the rhs of eq. (C.13) is equal to zero, then Quantity & Price regulation implements
the social optimum (cf. eq. (4)). The former is true, if and only if for all states we have x∗i = γiX̄.






Appendix D Quantity & Quantity regulation
Electricity Suppliers




Nxi + Ci(xi) s.t. xi ≤ x̄i ∀i (D.1)
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if xi < x̄i
≥ ∂Ci
∂xi
if xi = x̄i
(D.2a)
(D.2b)
RE deployment in state i is implicitly defined as a function of either the national clearing price,
xi(p
N ) as depicted by eq. (D.2a), or the state-level quantity cap, xi(x̄i) as depicted by eq. (D.2b).
Distinction of Equilibrium Cases
To analyze national and state policies we distinguish between two types of equilibrium that are
feasible. The two types are characterized by the relation of
∑n
i=1 x̄i and X̄.
Case A:
∑n
i=1 x̄i > X̄
If the sum of state-level quantity caps exceeds the national tender volume,
∑n
i=1 x̄i > X̄, then
the clearing price is competitively determined. Electricity suppliers bid at their marginal power
production costs to get awarded in the tendering process. If in equilibrium
∑n
i=1 x̄i > X̄, this
implies that at least in one state the quantity cap is non-binding, xa < x̄a, that is at least for
one supplier eq. (D.2a) applies. Further, the market clearing condition is met in equilibrium:
n∑
i=1
xi = X̄ (D.3)
State-level Policy
Given the national policy choice X̄, nationwide RE deployment is fixed to X = X̄ and thus
∂X
∂xi








+ pN (x) +
∂pN
∂xi
(xi − γiX̄) = 0 ∀i (D.4)
In equilibrium for states where the quantity cap is not binding, xa < x̄a (ambitious states)
and hence ∂Ca(xa)∂xa = p
N , it follows that ∂p
N
∂xa
= 0. Therefore, ambitious states set x̄a such that
∂Da(x̄a)
∂xa
= 0. In equilibrium for states where the quantity cap is binding, xr = x̄r (restrictive
states) and hence ∂Cr∂xr ≤ p











a ∈ A (D.5)







































































We see that 0 < ∂x̄i
∂X̄







We derive the national government’s choice of X̄ by differentiating the national welfare function





















and inserting eq. (D.4) for restrictive states and eq. (D.2a) for ambitious states























































i=1 x̄i ≤ X̄
If the sum of state-level quantity caps does not exceed the national tender volume,
∑n
i=1 x̄i ≤ X̄,
then all suppliers bid the ceiling price knowing that they are always awarded in the tendering
process. Hence, the clearing price is equal to the ceiling price, pN = p̄. In all states suppliers
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expand as much RE deployment as is possible, xi = x̄i, such that eq. (D.2b) applies for all
states. The market clearing condition need not be satisfied:
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ X̄ (D.15)
State-level Policy
Note that in this case nationwide RE deployment depends on the sum of state-level quantity
caps, X =
∑n
i=1 x̄i, and thus
∂X
∂xi
= 1. All state governments anticipate that national RE support
is effectively fixed at pN = p̄. Given the national policy choice of p̄ and X̄, we derive state i’s











+ (1− γi)p̄ = 0 ∀i (D.16)
National Policy
Since we look at an equilibrium with
∑n
i=1 x̄i ≤ X̄, that is the national tender volume is not
binding but each state’s quantity cap is binding, the choice of X̄ is by assumption arbitrary.
The national government chooses X̄ ≥
∑n
i=1 x̄i. We derive the national government’s choice of
p̄ by differentiating the national welfare function eq. (1) w.r.t. p̄ and setting the result equal to






































Proof of Proposition 4





≥ 0 ∀i, under Quantity & Quantity regulation the
socially optimal equilibrium implies that all states exert restrictive policies, x̄i = x
∗
i ∀i. National
and state-level policies are defined as in Case R by eq. (D.16) and (D.19). These are identical
to eq. (A.4) and (A.7) such that the efficiency condition of Proposition 1 applies. The national
tender volume must not bind such that the national government chooses X̄ ≥ X∗.





< 0 applies, then Quantity &
Quantity regulation can still implement the social optimum: Suppose that γi =
x∗i
X∗ ∀i and that
the national government sets X̄ = X∗. According to eq. (D.4) for pN = ∂B(X
∗)
∂X all states would
implement first-best RE deployment, except for state j where xj < x̄j = x
∗
j would ensue (see
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Case A). Since at this point the market is not cleared,
∑n
i=1 xi < X̄ = X
∗, the clearing price
would rise until
∑n
i=1 xi = X̄ = X
∗. As a result states enlarge their quantity caps such that∑n
i=1 x̄i > X













. Therefore, burden shares of all other (restrictive) states need






in state j and through eq. (D.4) in all other states. Combining these two









(xi − γiX̄) =
∂Cj
∂xj
∀i 6= j (D.20)













∀i 6= j (D.21)
In comparison to Proposition 3, the burden shares of restrictive states are adjusted according










< 0, the adjusted efficient burden shares of restrictive states are higher, γi >
x∗i
X∗ ∀i 6= j,
and the adjusted efficient burden share of the ambitious state is lower, γj <
x∗j
X∗ , and p
N is
higher, pN > ∂B(X
∗)
∂X compared to Proposition 3. By configuring burden shares according to eq.






< 0 solely applies for one state. If the latter applies for more than one

















< 0. That is only true by chance. Precisely,












Appendix E Simulation of First-best RE Deployment in
Germany
We assume quadratic cost and benefit functions for our numerical example. To generate the













xi represents the total amount of electricity produced from wind energy in state i in unit kWh.
Di and Ci represent total costs of wind energy deployment in state i in unit e.
45
We use data on the amount of power production (xi), the annual residential costs (Di) and
the annual power production costs (Ci) at 106,000 potential wind turbine sites in Germany
from (Tafarte et al., 2019). Taking the first derivative of eq. (E.1) and (E.2) w.r.t. xi, we




i by running a simple linear regression analysis in R (using the
lm-command). Table 4 presents the results.
Table 4 State-specific power production costs and residential costs of onshore wind energy deployment
in Germany









Baden-Wuerttemberg 4.47× 10−12 0.062 9.24× 10−13 1.677
Bavaria 2.29× 10−12 0.052 6.67× 10−13 4.748
Berlin 5.14× 10−8 0.06 3.86× 10−10 0
Brandenburg 2.19× 10−13 0.046 1.35× 10−13 48.154
Bremen 7.86× 10−9 0.051 1.32× 10−11 0.002
Hamburg 5.53× 10−8 0.057 0 0
Hesse 2.02× 10−12 0.046 4.79× 10−13 6.817
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2.15× 10−13 0.042 7.09× 10−14 66.641
Lower Saxony 4.20× 10−13 0.04 1.06× 10−13 38.076
North Rhine-Westfalia 1.05× 10−11 0.05 7.66× 10−13 1.33
Rhineland-Palatinate 4.68× 10−12 0.049 1.26× 10−12 2.617
Saarland 3.28× 10−10 0.068 2.41× 10−11 0.017
Saxony 1.98× 10−12 0.038 5.76× 10−13 8.215
Saxony-Anhalt 3.94× 10−13 0.049 8.45× 10−14 32.485
Schleswig-Holstein 1.96× 10−12 0.041 3.38× 10−13 8.517
Thuringia 1.59× 10−12 0.046 3.94× 10−13 8.607
Based on these estimations, we calculate states’ first-best RE deployment levels x∗ following
eq. (4). Hereto, we assume that the marginal nationwide benefit ∂B∂X from substituting one kWh
from fossil power production by one kWh from wind energy deployment is linearly decreasing
in X. Implicitly, we thus assume that the most harmful fossil sources are replaced first (e.g.
lignite). In 2019 German fossil power plants produced 243 TWh of electricity. On average,
lignite plants list highest in CO2 emission intensity of power production (1, 137 gCO2/kWh)
and gas plants record lowest (399 gCO2/kWh) (German Environment Agency, 2020, p. 16).
Assuming emission intensity of substituted power plants is linearly decreasing and social cost of
carbon (SCC) amount to 180 e/tCO2 or equivalently 0.00018 e/gCO2 (German Environment
Agency, 2020, p. 26), the benefit function is specified as follows:




where the parameters are calculated by:
β1 = 0.00018 e/gCO2 × 1, 137 gCO2/kWh = 0.20466 e/kWh (E.4)
β2 =
0.00018 e/gCO2 × (1, 137− 399) gCO2/kWh
243× 109 kWh
= 5.467× 10−13 e/kWh2 (E.5)
Simulating first-best wind energy deployment for Germany gives the nationwide socially optimal
power production of X∗ = 227.903 TWh (see Table 4). This corresponds to a marginal benefit
of ∂B(X
∗)
∂X = 0.20466 e/kWh. Of course, the level of SCC is uncertain and possibly below
180 e/tCO2. However, the relative distribution of RE deployment across the German states
presented in Table 3 and 4 remains similar.
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